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ANALYTICAL DIRECTIONS FOR DEBATING 
VALUE PROPOSITIONS 
Forrest Conklin and Michael Shultz 
In recent years the forensic community has heard an 
increasing clamor from within its ranks to adopt a non-polic:v 
proposition as the national debate topic. Indeed, the National 
Developmental Conference on Forensics joined this movement 
when it recommended that the profession give serious attention 
to the study of additional types of propositions. Perhaps 
in response to these expressed desires, the National Question 
Committee has submitted to debate coaches an occasional value 
proposition for consideration as the national debate topic. 
Generally these questions have gathered little support and have 
been voted to the bottom of the preferential lists upon 
which they appeared. 
The debate topic selection list for 1976-77 also 
included a value proposition. It, however, received the 
second highest number of preferential votes. Whether this 
showing for a value question resulted from an attempt by 
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coaches to adopt a non-policy proposition, or whether the 
vote represented a desire to debate the specific topic area 
of the question is not known. Regardless of the motivation 
behind the voting, forensics personnel almost became obli-
gated to analyze a type of proposition that has received 
scant attention by scholastic debating. 
Because we may soon select a non-policy proposition 
to debate nationally and the likelihood that it will encqmpass 
a value question, we believe that debate coaches should begin 
forming analysis on such propositions. Maturing this 
thinking now will ease the impact of value propositions on 
scholastic debating and ultimately will produce sounder 
approaches if and when we are confronted with a value question. 
This paper is submitted as a springboard into that analysis. 
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
Preliminary to a specific analysis of propositions 
of value, several observations should be made about the nature 
and importance of values within a society. First, fundamental 
values form the framework on which a society builds. These 
values may range from an unarticulated assumption to a 
formalized code. The former is illustrated by the concept 
that the strong and prosperous should assist their less fortu-
nate neighbors and has led to such public functions as foreign 
aid and the war on poverty. On the other hand, many values 
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are embodied in our Constitution and code of law (i.e., the 
right of free speech, the right of due process of law, the 
limitation of power through a system of checks and balances, 
etc.) and has led to such public policy as limiting the 
powers of policemen, striking down Jim Crow laws, and redefi-
ning obscenity laws. In the public sector, we constantly 
debate these values, as illustrated by recent cases. The 
war in Vietnam raised questions about the worth of the 
United States' involvement in the affairs of other nations. 
The Karen Quinlin case caused some people to consider if 
we are justified in prolonging "life" artificially. The "Right 
to Life" movement questioned the right of a woman to govern 
the function of her body over that of the fetus to reach 
full term. While these examples are but a small sample of 
a host of values which we have recently confronted, they 
illustrate how events call to our attention the values through 
which our society operates and the need for public debates 
on them. 
A second observation indicates that while the stability 
of our society depends in a large measure on the stability of 
its values and their structure most values remain kinetic. 
Probably dramatic shifts in our value structure would severely 
strain if not shred the fabric of the nation. On the other 
hand, a rigidity of values could lead to stagnation and could 
produce a death blow to any society. We should note, therefore, 
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that a society should tolerate, if it does not inherently 
need, an element of instability in its value system in 
order to meet the demands of changing times and situations. 
This condition is perhaps illustrated by our recent racial 
values. From the turn of the century we assumed that separate 
but equal facilities would provide adequate opportunity for 
our minorities. During the mid-nineteen fifties we became 
aware that this value reduced some people to a second class 
status, and only by shifting to more equitable policies 
could we attain our national value of equal opportunity for 
all citizens. To a large measure, the modification of our 
value structure is situationally bound. For instance, until 
recently it was believed that a college education would 
provide upward economic mobility for our youth. The recent 
closure of the job market, however, has denied many college 
graduates opportunity to work in their specialty and 
correspondingly has called into question the economic value 
of a college education. These illustrations demonstrate 
that changing events force us to make shifts in our value 
system and that these shifts will result from public 
consideration (debate) of the issue. 
A third observation suggests that there is a link 
between social values and public policy. Most, if not all, 
societal values are reflected in the public policies which 
our people enact. Indeed some may argue that a value is 
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not viable in a society until it is translated into public 
policy. Therefore, they contend, we need not concern 
ourselves with arguments on value propositions unless 
they are inherently linked to specific policies; that only 
by examining the policies growing out of our values can 
we really determine the viability of the value itself, i. e., 
it is good only as it has practical application. We 
recognize that values provide the underpining for any 
public policy. This perhaps is the position taken by 
presidential candidate Jimmy Carter when he argued that 
American foreign policy should reflect the "basic goodness 
of the American people." However, it appears that occasionally 
we need to examine the value independent of policy. For 
example, is it right to insist on prolonging a life when 
the terminally ill person is undergoing intense suffering? 
Or, is it right to use capital punishment to create the 
social good? Only as we determine these values can we really 
form justifiable public policies. Moreover, conflicts in 
values need to be settled at a specific point in time in 
order to give direction to our policies. A few years a go 
we placed restrictions on the power of police in order to 
maximize individual rights. The growing crime rate, however, 
is bringing this value into question as more people call 
for greater protection from criminals. To the extent that 
we resolve the conflict between these values, we can give 
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clear direction to public policy in the area of crime 
prevention. 
Our last observation suggests that existent scholarship 
has largely ignored non-policy propositions and offers little 
guidance for value questions. Traditional argumentation 
theory as it has evolved from Aristotle through Whately 
has focused on policy considerations. Notions of presumption, 
inherency, harm, and causality all demonstrate a concern for 
legal structure rather than the values that underlie policy 
determinations. Contemporary debate theory, building on 
traditional notions, has led to such a specialized approach 
to policy propositions that the differences between two 
debates are nearly non-existent. We, therefore, feel that 
the forensics community is obligated to investigate alternatives 
that might revitalize debate and bring the process of invention 
to the front. This will concommitantly require an examination 
of traditional theories of argumentation vis-a-vis non-policy 
propositions. 
DIRECTIONS FOR ANALYSIS OF VALUE PROPOSITIONS 
While most of the discussion surrounding propositions 
of value has been of a "should we or shouldn't we" nature, we 
feel it is equally important to consider, "how do we debate 
propositions of value?" Such discussion can then aid us in 
making a rational decision concerning the use of value 
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propositions. An examinatio~ of the nature of values 
leads us to three different affirmative approaches for 
a value propositiona value app lication; value compari s on; 
and evaluative judgments. We do not offer these as 
prescriptive formulae, but as suggested paradigms in 
constructing the resolution. 
The value application is the simplest approach which 
an affirmative can take. It develops from our basic notion 
that society has certain values which have gained consensual 
confirmation. McCroskey1 described this phenomenon when he 
defined values as "our enduring concepts of the nature of 
good and evil." Krue ger2 also spoke of values as "anything 
taken by general consent as a basis of comparison; an approved 
model." Both definitions express the notion that there are 
some generally static values that a society affirmsa love, 
peace, equality, and opportunity exemplify these values. 
With this concept the affirmative can discover the 
first model for development of their rationale. Initially, 
the affirmative should identify a value that has gained 
consensual confirmation. Some proof might be offered to 
demonstrate the value's preeminent nature. Second, the 
affirmative would identify those behaviors or practices 
which do not conform to the value. Last, the affirmative 
could implicitly or explicitly suggest modifying or elimi-
nating those behaviors or practices which do not conform 
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to the value. 
A sample proposition can help explain this threefold 
process. A current controversy surrounds the family viewing 
time on network television. A proposition might statea That 
the family view period is unjustified. While it would be 
possible to describe facts concerning programming, audiences, 
and attitude formation, a simpler approach would be the "value 
application." Following our three step development, the affirma-
tive would indicate how the family viewing time limits the 
freedom of expression by prescribing what may or may not be 
presented. Finally, the affirmative could call for the elimi-
nation of the family viewing time. Through this process the 
affirmation would ask the judge to concur that the family 
viewing time is unjustified and that we need to reaffirm the 
right to freedom of expression by eliminating the viewing period. 
Value comparison, our second paradigm, is a more 
elaborate plan than value application. It recognizes that 
a society employs several important values and that these values 
form a hierarchical structure. With this concept the affirmative 
would follow a five step process. First, it would identify 
a value which it felt is important. Second, it would indi-
cate the value's current place within our present hierarchy. 
Third, the affirmative would demonstrate why 
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its value is inappropriately placed within the hierarchy, 
thus requiring a fundamental examination of values and 
their ascension to primacy within the society. A fourth, 
though optional, step for the affirmative would be to 
argue that the value with which they are concerned must 
replace values now above it, or that it could co-exist with 
other values. Finally, the affirmative could specify how 
the value could be moved up within the hierarchy. 
Again a sample proposition aids our understandings 
Using the abortion issue, we might be resolveda That the 
right to abortion on demand is an illegitimate right. 
Following the first two steps, the affirmative could advance 
the right to life as the important value, and show that it 
currently ranks low in our hierarchy as evidenced by the 
right to abortion. The affirmative could next compare the 
right to life value with the right to free choice. It would 
be necessary for the affirmative to demonstrate that the 
right to life should be considered more "inalienable" than 
the right to free choice. As an option the affirmative could, 
fourth, discuss whether the former right must replace the 
latter right in the hierarchy or if they might somehow be 
compatible. Last, the affirmative might specify what they 
would do about the practice of abortion. This process has 
been reviewed regarding propositions of policy.3 It 
recognizes that values are not always static and that 
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different situations require re-examination of our value 
structure. 
The last paradigm to be discussed here, evaluative 
judgment, is different in its approach because it involves 
a different definition for value. Rather than looking at 
existent values, it seeks to define what has merit and how 
merit is determined. Ziegelmueller and Dause4 refer to 
propositions of value as judgments based on some list of 
evaluative criteria. 
The process used by the affirmative would require 
five steps. First, the affirmative would point out the 
evaluative term in the proposition, (the evaluative term 
is the adjective or adverb modifying the issue under 
discussion). Second, the affirmative would specify the 
criteria by which the evaluation will be made. The next 
two steps work in conjunction. The affirmative would compare 
the concept or practice under discussion with the criteria 
depending on the direction of the evaluation. Last, the 
affirmative would suggest how practices might be modified 
to meet these criteria. 
The issue of police power offers this potential 
resolutiona That Supreme Court decisions have unnecessarily 
restricted law enforcement. The term "unnecessarily" makes 
this an evaluative judgment. After this identification, 
the affirmative would demonstrate the criteria that would 
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make restrictions on the police unnecessary. These could 
include no benefit to the society, no benefit to the 
individual, lack of logic in the restriction, etc. The 
affirmative would next compare restrictions on the police 
with these criteria and demonstrate how these restrictions 
meet the criteria for being unnecessary. Finally, the 
affirmative could suggest that the police should be given 
more power. 
The preceding discussion suggests three methods 
by which the affirmative might develop the rationale for 
affirming the resolution. These methods vary in their 
emphasis and their notion of "value." Several important 
questions, however, remain after this discussion. While 
this paper cannot address all the issues involved in this 
controversy, several objections to our concerns about 
propositions of value should be considered. 
Those who are reluctant to accept propositions of 
value maintain that such propositions avoid the real world 
argumentation and the political nature of our society. As 
we have indicated, the specification of policy changes is 
an option for the affirmative, not a requirement. While 
this might ignore the specifics of the policy implementation, 
it provides greater time within the debate to consider the 
values which form the basis for our political decision. 
A second objection to debating propositions of value 
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is the alleged inconclusiveness of philosophical debates. 
Where the two teams argue from different criteria or 
different values, clash might be missing from the debate. 
If we are to debate propositions of value, it will be 
necessary for those who write debate topics to pay close 
attention to the "debatability" of a topic. Following 
this concern, the teams involved will choose a strategy 
which may ignore the opposition and supports their own 
arguments, or they may choose to attack the values and 
criteria of the opposition. Thus, while clash and conclu-
siveness may sometimes be avoided, it is not a necessary 
outcome. 
The question of greatest importance involves the 
place of traditional notions of argumentation. It must 
be determined if traditional argumentation requirements 
are relevant to value discussions. A cursory analysis leads 
us to conclude that presumption becomes more important in 
value debate; harm returns to a level proposed by the 
original advocates of comparative advantages; and inherency 
retains it current attention to structural and attitudinal 
barriers to change. Some may argue that inherency will not 
be relevant in value discussions since our concern is only 
with what "should be" compared to "what is." Our assessment 
here remains equivocal. 
Finally, the injection of judge bias into the debate 
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must be addressed. There is a valid concern that the 
decision made by a judge will not be made on the basis 
of who does the better debating, but who best fits their 
arguments to the judge's predisposition. The judging 
community will have to examine their ability to suspend 
judgments based ·On their values -- a behavior already 
expected when judging policy debates. 
Our discussion of the relationship between values 
and society is of a preliminary nature. The models for 
the affirmative rationale are presented to open a more 
elaborate discussion of how a value debate should proceed. 
The concerns about debating propositions of value remain; 
we do not pretend that easy answers exist. Our hope is that 
the forensics community can build on this analysis and that 
a rational decision can be made about debating propositions 
of value. 
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